Episode Transcript
The Finance Ghost: Welcome to episode 262 of Magic Markets. That's a lot of episodes, and we still try to bring you new things along the way!
This is the first episode of something quite exciting that we are doing in 2026, which is to try and expose you, as the listener, to some of the really good, I’d say, boutique asset managers in South Africa, although obviously that's quite an umbrella term. Just some of the really good minds out there who are managing money, allocating capital and having some great thoughts along the way.
Today is the first such example that we will be doing this year – it's by no means the last – and it's going to be a really fun one.
Before I introduce our guest, let me at least say hello to Moe, because Moe, you are also here. You’re not our ‘great fund manager’ allocating capital today, but you are here and thank you for being here, as always. And then I'll say hello to Dagon.
Mohammed Nalla: Yeah, thanks, Ghost. This week, I'm not the brains of the show – and I guess most weeks, I'm not the brains of the show. I'm glad we've got Dagon on the show here to share his insights from the coalface of what they're doing at Aylett & Co.
And just for some context, Aylett & Co. – that's a company I remember from close on 20 years ago, when they launched as a little boutique fund manager.
I remember I was at Nedbank, early on in my career, and they started up the Nedbank Bravata Fund or something to that effect. Walter Aylett, who was effectively the founder of the firm, was there on the stage telling us his ethos. So for me, it's nice to come full circle.
It's very nice to have Dagon on the show to take us through where the thinking evolved, how it’s actually played out. And then also to get into some of the nitty-gritty around how they're looking at specific sectors and specific stocks.
Dagon, really excited to have you here on Magic Markets.
Dagon Sachs: Thank you for having me. And your memory is correct. I think it's probably 21 years ago that we started, and that Nedbank backed us to run the Bravata Fund. Really, the whole business has evolved thereafter, and it's been, let's say, a helluva journey.
The Finance Ghost: Yeah, I can well believe it. So that is Dagon Sachs from Aylett & Co. For those who want to go find him on LinkedIn, we'll obviously include a link in the show notes. If you like what you hear, then you may want to reach out or go and learn about some of the funds at Aylett & Co.
Today, we're going to talk about some really cool stuff around capital allocation, and we're also going to use the hospitality industry as an example.
But before we actually get there, Dagon, it'll be good to just give us a quick lay of the land around the Aylett business – essentially, the way you guys think. Obviously, as a fund manager, you've got a particular common thread that goes throughout your style and the way you view the world. Let's start there.
For those who maybe aren't as familiar with the Aylett brand as Moe, who seems to have some nice core memories there, give us the journey of how the business has evolved since it was started? Since you were there from the start, I might add. You've been there the whole time!
Dagon Sachs: Sure, yeah. Thank you. I think the idea was always to build a business where you could implement all the principles that you'd learned over many years in the game. Really, what we've tried to build is a business where we are bottom-up asset pickers. That’s probably the best way to put it.
We don't try to be macro experts. We don't think that gives us any real sort of edge. We think our edge is in really spending our time analysing businesses, really digging deep, visiting the companies and doing thorough, thorough research.
Let me also just add that we are not benchmark-cognisant. We are what they call benchmark-agnostic, which means we're not for everyone. We build our portfolio based on the best ideas we have, and so it doesn't necessarily always follow the markets up or down. It introduces what some people like to call ‘tracking error’, but that's the way we do it. We know no other way.
We eat our own cooking. There's no PA investing that's allowed in the firm. If you want to invest, you put your money alongside your client's money. We try to keep it very simple in that respect, and it's worked really, really well.
We've tried very hard to focus on performance and not be asset gatherers, as such, and rather really just focus on putting our heads down, staying out of the media, working hard and letting the performance speak for itself.
And it takes time. It's a slow way to build a business, but we feel like we've got like-minded clients, clients who understand us in the way we think, and we've built a really strong business in that fashion.
The Finance Ghost: I laugh about the reference to staying out of the media, because obviously, here you are on the Magic Markets podcast. Thank you for trusting us with that, because I know that it is actually something that doesn't necessarily come naturally to you guys.
Moe, we've managed to extract them and get them on here, which is quite exciting.
Mohammed Nalla: Yeah, I think that's so important because at the end of the day, we've got these fund managers out there, players like Aylett & Co. that maybe aren't in the media.
They're not above the radar, and so a lot of people lose that innovative thinking. A lot of people lose that ability to see a fund manager take on that tracking error and not be afraid to actually move away from the herd.
So Dagon, a lot of what you're saying resonates with me. Investing alongside your clients, that's a strong alignment of interests. And kudos to fund managers who do that, who eat their own cooking, effectively.
Now, I don't want to get too sidetracked. We did indicate to our listeners that we wanted to get into some of the weeds with you. Just your thinking in terms of how you look at companies.
You've indicated that you are a bottom-up house. That is true, but I know that you also manage a balanced portfolio. So, let's start with Capital Allocation 101, because you’re obviously a capital allocator, at the end of the day, in that balanced portfolio.
Obviously, as a bottom-up manager, there's a strong equity component that comes through in that. I really want to understand, if we actually take that capital allocation thinking a step further, why it’s important to you as an investor to make sure that when you're investing in an equity, in a company that is in your portfolio, that management is then allocating capital in a way that you are happy with.
And how do you gauge that? What are some of the metrics that you use to make an assessment of whether the company you're investing in is actually doing a good capital allocation job itself?
Dagon Sachs: I think that's a very good question you’re asking. It probably goes right back to the most important thing. When you want to value any asset, the textbooks will tell you that it is only worth the future cash flows, discounted back to today to work out what it's worth. Now, that's quite easy.
The problem comes in when, okay, let's assume that in that discount, you've already taken care of the maintenance capex needed to keep the business going. So the free cash flow that it generates, the biggest thing is if that is given back to you as a shareholder, then the maths works.
But then, what really happens in reality is that management often takes some of that cash and invests it in future projects.
Now, let's say R1 of cash is taken from you, and it is well invested, and it creates R2 of value – you're very happy as a shareholder. Of course, the reverse is also true. When management takes that money and invests in projects that ultimately don't return that cash to you, and that perhaps don't work.
So, it can get very complicated when you think about all those sorts of things. But in the end, that is the most important thing, as an investor. To sit and say, “Is the cash – which is really the value of the business – being allocated correctly?”
Now, there are obviously various metrics you can use. You can look at return on invested capital (ROIC). That's a lovely metric that tells you over time, and you can't hide from that. But it doesn't have to be that hard.
Your job is to sit every six months and look at the cash that was generated and what was done with it. Was it rational? Does it make sense? And if not, I put to you that your valuation is wrong, because your DCF is not going to give you the cash that it said it would.
The Finance Ghost: Of course, part of the problem is the control over that cash, right? And this is where you have to trust management. This is where you have to feel like management is going to make good decisions with shareholder money.
And of course, one of the big challenges we face on the market is the alignment of shareholder interests and management interests.
So, where you have managers who are not necessarily big shareholders, but are potentially big bonus earners, they are essentially being incentivised to swing for the fences with your money.
Whereas if you have managers who are big shareholders alongside you, I think you stand a better chance. As opposed to swinging for the fences, they might actually go and say, “Well, we stand to lose here in the equity stack as well, and so we're maybe going to make slightly more sensible decisions.”
It’s a really interesting conundrum at the end of the day. I guess that's why certain management teams attract the valuation – because they've built the trust in the market.
And when other management teams break the trust in the market (and there are unfortunately some very recent examples, even here on the JSE), then you have a scenario where you get a big D-rating in the valuation and things get ugly pretty quickly.
One of the ways that I know investors try to feel good about that is that they seek out capital-light businesses – certainly, some investors do. I'm keen to get your views on this, because if there's just less capital that needs to be reinvested in the business all the time, then perhaps the risk of that capital being used incorrectly goes down.
Having said that, of course, the risk of big swashbuckling acquisitions is always there. Maybe it's even worse in a capital-light business, actually. I don't know.
Keen to get your views here. How do you look at it, in terms of capital-light versus capex-heavy businesses? Do you have a preference for either one, or do you kind of treat each one on its merits, along with the management team?
Dagon Sachs: Something that you said earlier just rang true for me. I think it was Charlie Munger who said, “Show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome.”
So, we try not to get too involved as major shareholders, if we are in a business, in how to run the business. That's not our job. But we do look at making sure that management is incentivised correctly to allocate the capital in the best way possible. I think that is vital.
And it's not for us to stand on the back benches and throw stones and say, “You see? You shouldn't have done that,” or, “You should run the business this way,” but where we can get involved is helping to set the framework for what is rational in terms of the capital allocation, the money that's taken from us as shareholders, and what’s done with it.
Getting to your question, I think there's no doubt that nirvana is a capital-light business with huge growth prospects. You've got a long runway of growth, and it's going to take no money to do it. But to some extent, that's often a unicorn, and if you do find it, it's on 50x earnings or whatever the story is.
I think in reality (particularly if you're investing on the JSE, where your choice is limited), you're constantly weighing up on a scale the degree of capital-light versus capital-heavy, the degree of growth that's available to you, and trying to put those two together to get a sense of valuation.
I would say to you that sometimes, a capital-light business has perhaps a greater risk of those cash flows being misused, because you can imagine - this business generates all that cash, and then if it just keeps going off to shareholders, I'm sure it's very tempting to say, “Hang on, we can do something better with that.”
Where sometimes, with capital-heavy businesses, there isn't as much free cash being thrown off. When you have to think hard about spending R1 billion, you're going to think very carefully about making sure that you've dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s.
The Finance Ghost: I guess the other risk is share buybacks at any price, right? You have a situation where a business is capitalised and they don't necessarily want to pay everything as a dividend in cash. They inevitably start using share buybacks.
But that thing will often trade at a big premium valuation, as you say, and you end up with share buybacks that just get baked in at any price. That’s the US tech story, right? With the additional layer where, half the time, they're basically just offsetting stock-based compensation with those share buybacks?
Dagon Sachs: Correct. And we often try to think: imagine that you owned this whole business and it wasn't listed. What would be the rational thing to do? You can kind of go through a very easy decision tree of, once you've used all the money you need to maintain the business, now there's extra cash, what opportunities are available?
Compare those to buying back your own shares, where you don't need to do due diligence on your business – but of course, it's valuation dependent. And also comparing that to saying, “Realistically, if I don't have ideas, well then pay out the cash.” Assuming your balance sheet is already strong first, of course.
We try to think about it like that because I think the challenge in the listed space is that once you start paying a dividend, you expect it to continue paying a dividend. And maybe there are times when the rational thing to do is to stop paying a dividend and pay down your debt or buy back shares, but there are many reasons and incentives in the markets that make it quite difficult to do that.
Mohammed Nalla: Yeah, I like that. Very rational approach. You've used that word quite a bit, and I want to hone in on that – “what's the rational thing to do?” Because sometimes it's share buybacks, sometimes it's paying down the debt.
You've mentioned you're looking at the JSE, and maybe your subset is quite limited there. If you widen that lens internationally, one of the most egregious examples of just throwing your cash flow into capex and becoming a capex-heavy business has been the tech space.
I mean, if you just look at how they're burning through hundreds of billions of dollars worth of capital, that again is a bit of a risk flag. Maybe I’m getting a little bit sidetracked there. I don't want to go into the tech space here.
We've mentioned something here in terms of the hospitality space because that's a great example where we've seen businesses effectively migrate from these traditional capital-heavy businesses into capital-light businesses.
I want to maybe use that as an international test case, because we've seen those groups go on. They build these strong brands and then, in that initial phase, they use their own capital. They build the hotels, and then after that, they almost pivot and use that brand strength to enter that franchise phase, which is effectively the capital-light model that comes through.
That's where they almost become the unicorn that you're speaking about. Maybe they do, maybe they don't. That's when they start growing through other people's money. That's something that Ghost and I love talking about on the show.
Now, where I'm going with this question is, have you actually observed a trend in the hospitality space, maybe even in other sectors, where you see these companies – they're good, they have sound businesses, they’re generating the cash flows, then they reach that inflection point, and it just unlocks that massive runway of growth?
What are your thoughts on that, from an investment perspective? You described it as ‘nirvana’, right? How hard is it to actually find those? And in which sectors do you think you'd find those most easily? Because it's all been about tech over the last while, but that's not necessarily where the best investment subset lies.
Dagon Sachs: Yeah, that's a very complex question. I think probably the oldest debate we've had in this business is this debate around OpCo/PropCo (Operating Company / Property Company). Does it make sense to own your assets, to be asset-heavy, in the hospitality space? Does it make sense not to be?
And it's always come out that “it depends” is the answer. It's not black and white.
Your comments on the international hotel groups are actually quite fascinating because what you've had there are developed market groups that, as you say, initially were asset-heavy. They owned all their hotels, and they created a brand, and they were able to market that brand really, really well.
And then what you have is business and, let's call it ‘leisure’ travellers from the developed market starting to travel to other parts of the world.
Let's take a very random example. You're an executive in the US. You want to come visit Cape Town, and you say, “Look, I don't know who City Lodge is. I don't know who Southern Sun is, but I know who Marriott is. Just book me into a Marriott.”
You can see how that model has really worked, as those groups have now been able to take that model and expand it throughout the world, based on that brand (and, of course, the loyalty schemes and very clever things they've done as well).
But we've often looked at it the other way around and said, “Can that work in reverse?” And certainly it appears as though it can’t.
Take Southern Sun, which owns pretty much all of its assets. There isn't that big group of people travelling from South Africa to the US or to Paris saying, “Find me a Southern Sun.” That's not the way they think about it.
The franchise model is very interesting. If you were to look at Spur – Famous Brands, perhaps less so, but Spur is very asset-light. They've built that business on much the same basis. You can look at a number of the international players there that do similar things, and those are good examples, I think.
The big issue, if I go back to the hospitality that you brought up, is that you’ve got to look at each place in its own little niche.
Southern Sun, for example, controls most of the hotel stock in the key places that you want to be. They're not beholden to the OTAs. They're not beholden to needing to have a brand that someone else can send your way.
They sit in a position saying, “Well, we own the Beverly Hills Hotel. If you want to come and stay at the Beverly Hills Hotel, you're coming to us.” That's the difference, really, and you have to look at it piece by piece.
The Finance Ghost: Yeah, it's fascinating. I remember the first time I was really exposed to that international hospitality approach. It was when I think we covered Hyatt in Magic Markets Premium, and you can really see it coming through now.
They talk about how it's a boost to return on equity (ROE) because they're now starting to earn franchise fees where they're not having to apply their own capital.
It's something that Stor-Age has started doing in the property space as well. Trying to generate more and more of those fees by actually managing properties for people, as opposed to always applying their own money. Lots of good examples of that.
The OpCo/PropCo debate, as you've raised it there, that's a classic one. MTN is going the other way at the moment, with their deal to acquire IHS. Pretty interesting. They want to own the towers in Africa as opposed to actually just being the OpCo. That's something that kind of bucks the trend and what we tend to see in the space.
It's actually cool that you raised Famous Brands versus Spur, because Famous Brands may be a good example there of the danger when there’s cash lying around that can be used for transactions, right? It’s technically a capital-light franchise model, but they've unfortunately done some deals that really hurt shareholders along the way.
So, like you said earlier, capital-light may not be a guarantee of success, actually, versus capex-heavy. It really depends on what happens with the money.
But Southern Sun – locally, really impressive business. I think it's a great management team. I hosted them (or co-hosted them) on Unlock the Stock towards the end of last year. Really cool management team. I love the way they think. So, that's something you've raised as a goodie, locally.
City Lodge is something that I've bought into. Pretty interesting business. I like what they did with the food and beverage side.
Maybe this is a good opportunity to understand more about your investment thesis. You've mentioned some of it there already, which is how they own key properties, etcetera, but my understanding is you do have Southern Sun as one of your kind of ‘core’ holdings in your funds.
Just maybe walk us through why that’s the case. What do you like about it so much, beyond just these cool properties that they have? Because of course it's other stuff – it’s valuation, it's management, it's all the important characteristics, right?
Dagon Sachs: Yeah, sure. It's been a very long road we've walked with them. There was a split of the casino group and the hotel group at one point. That's really what gave us an opportunity to look much more closely at just the hotels.
The big thing for us, when we looked at it, was trying to understand the economics as they stood at the time. Because it's a very cyclical industry. If you were to take a step back and say, “What happens in hotels?”
Well, when there's a lot more demand than there is hotel room stock available, not only do you fill your hotel, but you also get to charge more per room. So, you can really get a sort of ‘hockey-stick’ effect on your revenue line and then, of course, you start earning decent returns on the amount you have invested in the land and buildings.
But once you sort of get to an excessive level there, it starts to become attractive for someone to put a hotel next to you.
One of the things you always see in the hotel sector is that eventually, someone puts an extra hotel in a region. Inevitably, too many hotels go up, your occupancy drops, it gets harder and harder to fill your rooms, you start charging less, and you get a double whammy on the downside as well.
So, you have to bear in mind that there is that cyclicality. And it's quite regional – what’s happening not just in the Western Cape, but in a specific node. That's what you have to watch very closely.
Marcel, as you said, you can see the rationality of the way he manages that business. He often says, “The problem is that hotels are attractive assets to the ego, so when you talk about ROE, it's Return On Ego.”
Very often, people build hotels (people with lots of money), because they want to build something that looks nice, that they can be proud of. And the economics don't necessarily stack up if you were to be, let's say, in a corporate with some quite strict criteria as to the return on the amount you're putting into it.
So, that’s what you’re always up against. But I think if you look through the cycle, they've turned out to be pretty strong assets.
What keeps us excited about the business itself is that even though we've gone from R2.50 a share or even less, I think Marcel was reminding me the other day, to R10 or R11 a share today, that doesn't get close to what it would cost you to build those assets.
Now, what it would cost to build those assets is largely irrelevant in terms of its current economics. No one cares about that. But that gives you some idea of what it would cost someone else to put that asset in. And until those economics make sense, they shouldn't, in theory, put more hotels in.
So when we look at Southern Sun today, we worry about new hotels that go up in the Western Cape because that's clearly the tourism space at the moment. But if you look around the rest of the country, that's really where the opportunity sits.
Because those assets are earning quite a low return relative to, let's say, what they're worth and what they would cost to build. And there's no new capacity coming on in Gauteng, as an example. I think that's where the opportunity for the rest of the portfolio lies.
The Finance Ghost: So, Moe is our resident bear. I don't doubt he's got a question around risk, which I'll let him ask you now, but I just wanted to say that that's really interesting around replacement costs.
I've seen those arguments come through before to say, “Oh, the replacement cost is, I don't know, two bucks. And the thing is trading at one buck.” Just a silly example. And you're right, that's technically irrelevant, and I've always thought that.
But it's also not irrelevant, in the context of a cyclical business where new stock can come on. So that's pretty interesting, actually. It's a bit of a defensive element of it. When things are depressed, you're just not going to get that new stock coming in.
It's almost like mining, actually. When commodity prices are down, you just don't see the same level of exploration and activity. So, yeah, very interesting.
Moe, I don't doubt that you've got some other thoughts around risk, knowing you as I do.
Mohammed Nalla: I was chuckling because you mentioned mining as an analogy, and I was thinking the same thing. Because Dagon was talking about the competitive pressures, the cyclicality. How sunk assets effectively give you a bit of a moat in some instances, except for your new build. I thought those insights were very fascinating.
I also like the aspects of operational leverage and financial leverage that come through in that hospitality sector quite nicely. As you say, you've got a limited number of beds, and then, if they get booked up and there's demand, you can actually flex the price a little bit. Those are pretty decent aspects that come through.
But as Ghost has said, I'm the resident bear here, and so I'm going to ask the question around risk. You've already mentioned the risk of new supply coming onstream – and again, with hotels, with hospitality, it's very location specific.
It's like finding the right seam, if we're talking about mining as an analogy. You've got to find the right ore body and so forth. With hospitality, it's similar. You've got to find the right locations.
But then there are lots of people with deep pockets out there, specifically in hot markets like in the Western Cape at the moment. That gives you a lot of competitive pressure, so we see that as one of the points you've raised.
But what are some of the other risks which keep you up at night? Maybe specifically in this hospitality sector, but then also more broadly across the rest of the portfolio as you're positioned today?
Dagon Sachs: Firstly, let me say that I think your mining analogy is spot on in the sense that if you were to go back to Anglo American 30 years ago, as an example, they were unbelievably good at being countercyclical.
When assets were in hot demand, they tended to let those assets spin off lots and lots of cash. They made no acquisitions, they built their balance sheet, and they waited for the tough times.
And when the tough times hit and some of the more marginal mines were struggling, they were able to be opportunistic and pick up assets for - not next to nothing, but clearly a cheap price. That is the way that you want your hotel business to run as well.
I think one of the things that we've seen in the way Southern Sun has been run is quite similar. They have tried to sort of accumulate cash to gear their balance sheet, wait for those opportunities to hit and then they have the ability to strike and buy those assets cheaply.
And certainly, when they were combined with the gaming group back in the day and there was just this huge cash flow, they were very disciplined about what they did. They always kept those assets in top nick, much the way Anglo American used to make sure their mines were always well looked after. You never had to worry about underinvestment. And I'm going back a long time ago, when I say that.
You talk about what worries us. Management can always change. The pressures on management can change from various shareholders who want different things. I think those are always possible, and you're always going to have the risks around new hotels coming in.
I think you have to always be concerned, if you're in the tourism industry, that we as South Africa shoot ourselves in the foot again and do something silly, because we've seen how quickly that tourism can disappear.
If you're sitting, trying to book your room, and somewhere there's a headline that Cape Town is out of water… Well, you're just going to go somewhere else. Or that there's no electricity, you're just going to go somewhere else again, or perhaps that there's a riot or something that, God forbid, we don't want to see. Those worry us.
But I think that's also why, when you invest in that space, you always have to be cognisant of the risk and make sure you've got a margin of safety. That's why you don't want to have a net debt to EBITDA of 4x when you're running a hotel group. It's not that you can't service it in the good times; it's when there's trouble.
The Finance Ghost: Yeah. And when there's travel and EBITDA comes down, then that net debt to EBITDA spikes, as we've seen with the likes of Sappi and some of the other cyclical players.
Dagon, I'm going to steal one more question with you. We're being slightly cheeky on time here, but there's one other thing I wanted to ask you.
In terms of your approach, do you do something like understand the hotel industry and then consider, “Okay, locally I can pick Southern Sun, City Lodge, and then internationally there's Hyatt, there's Marriott,” whatever the case may be?
Or do you look at it and say, “Okay, Southern Sun's a good company. I'm prepared to learn about the sector, but I'm not actively seeking an international equivalent,” for example?
So are you saying, “I want to own hospitality, let me find the stock,” or are you saying, “I like the stock, let me learn the sector”? What tends to be your approach?
Dagon Sachs: Yeah, I would answer that it's a little bit of both and also none of the above. The important thing when you look at South Africa is to accept that at our size, we manage 23-odd billion. There are about 120 stocks to choose from right now. If you’re 10 times our size, there are very few stocks to choose from - that gets very difficult to be able to move.
So, in the South African context, there are only these stocks. You look at them and you try to understand them.
When you're looking overseas, you have the comfort or the privilege of being able to look and say, “I don't really like that industry. I'm not even going to look further,” and you can dig into those business models that you really, really like, and there's more than enough to find.
We always say, “You want to use your eyes and plagiarise.” You want to see if you find something in South Africa that you really like, can you find something similar overseas? And the reverse.
It talks to how we set up our analysts. Our analysts have the freedom to look at whatever they want, but they tend to become sector specialists. They get really good at retail (or hospitality, or gambling, or whatever it may be), and then you look around the world, and they understand what's happening in the various markets.
It gives you a much better perspective and context to understand what's really going on, let's say, for the stock you're looking at in South Africa.
Mohammed Nalla: Dagon, thanks. Those are all fascinating insights, and I always feel as though we've only just scratched the surface. I look forward to many more detailed discussions with you.
I do tend to get reigned in. Ghost always tells our listeners – and this is true, I get sidetracked sometimes. He tells me, “Moe, you go off on a tangent,” and “Your questions are too tangential.” So I have restrained myself.
But Dagon, hopefully the next time we have you on Magic Markets, he’ll let me loose a little bit more than I am right now, and I can ask some of those more tangential questions. Maybe in the interest of time, it's a good thing that I didn't have time to ask those more tangential questions, because we are out of time...
The Finance Ghost: …Moe just wants to talk about macro! He just wants to talk about macro. That is what this comes down to. Moe is missing his macro segments at the start of the show. That's what this is all about.
Mohammed Nalla: Not always true! Dagon, I really appreciate the bottom-up insights that you've given us here and I certainly look forward to inviting you back onto Magic Markets in the future.
To our listeners, we hope you've enjoyed this. It's something that we're trying that is different, to give you a different perspective out there on markets, on how people are analysing their investments, how they put together the investment theses.
Let us know what you thought of the show. Hit us up on social media. It’s @MagicMarketsPod, @FinanceGhost and @MohammedNalla, all on X. Or you can find us on LinkedIn. Pop us a note on there. We hope you've enjoyed this. Until next week – same time, same place. Thanks, and Dagon, thank you so much.
Dagon Sachs: Thank you, guys. Really enjoyed that.
The Finance Ghost: Yeah, thank you, Dagon. We'll include in the show notes the links to Aylett & Co. Go and check out the funds. Go and learn more about them. We look forward to having you back, Dagon. Thank you so much, and ciao.
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